Hatley-Mayo-Leahy : Brothers in Arms (1)
So, the question is how – at one and the same time – we can ensure we give no quarter to terrorism and organized crime, while still advancing the liberties our society is founded upon… The British way cannot be a head-in-the-sand approach that ignores the fact that the world has changed with the advent of terrorism, which aims for civilian casualties on a massive scale and which respects not only no law, but also no recognizable moral framework. Instead, it must be an approach that is prepared to make the difficult decisions to protect our security – not by ignoring the demands of liberty but always at the same time doing everything we can to protect the individual from unfair or arbitrary treatment.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
Speech on Security and Liberty
June 17, 2008
Holzheim, Belgium, 29 January 1945
The fierce drive of C Co 508th Parachute Infantry Division (82nd Airborne Division) quickly overran Holzheim, netting some 80 prisoners, who were placed under a 4-man guard, all that could be spared, while the rest of the understrength unit went about mopping up isolated points of resistance. An enemy patrol, by means of a ruse, succeeded in capturing the guards and freeing the prisoners, and had begun preparations to attack C Co from the rear when 1st Sgt Leonard D. Funk walked around the building and into their midst. He was ordered to surrender by a German officer who pushed a machine pistol into his stomach. Although overwhelmingly outnumbered and facing almost certain death, 1st Sgt Funk, pretending to comply with the order, began slowly to unsling his submachine gun from his shoulder and then, with lightning motion, brought the muzzle into line and riddled the German officer. He turned upon the other Germans, firing and shouting to the other Americans to seize the enemy’s weapons. In the ensuing fight 21 Germans were killed, many wounded, and the remainder captured. 1st Sgt Funk’s bold action and heroic disregard for his own safety were directly responsible for the recapture of a vastly superior enemy force, which, if allowed to remain free, could have taken the widespread units of C Co by surprise and endangered the entire attack plan.
Was 1st Sgt Leonard D. Funk Arrested, Court Marshalled, and Sentenced to Jail ? No he got a well deserved Congressional Medal of Honor.(premeditated killing of 21 enemy soldiers)
(Rank and organization : First Sergeant, US Army, C Co. 508th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. Place and date : Holzheim, Belgium, 29 January 1945. (CMH)
Do you want another example of Military Jurisprudence ? Even a better one because Sgt Lopez killed over 100 German Soldiers.
Krinkelt, Belgium, December 17 1944
I will have to correct some things into this citation because War Time Historians were always and still are so wrong.
On his own initiative, Sgt Jose Lopez carried his Browning Cal. 50 heavy machine gun from Company K’s right flank to its left, in order to protect that flank which was in danger of being overrun by advancing enemy infantry supported by tanks (advanced element of the 12. SS Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend). Occupying a shallow hole offering no protection above his waist (the position was located 50 yards behind the his Company Commander (the CC was Lt. Charles B. MacDonald), he cut down a group of 10 Germans. Ignoring enemy fire from an advancing tank, he held his position and cut down 25 more enemy infantry attempting to turn his flank. Glancing to his right, he saw a large number of infantry swarming in from the front. Although dazed and shaken from enemy artillery fire which had crashed into the ground only a few yards away, he realized that his position soon would be outflanked. Again, alone, he carried his machine gun to a position to the right rear of the sector; enemy tanks and infantry were forcing a withdrawal.
Blown over backward by the concussion of enemy fire, he immediately reset his gun and continued his fire. Single-handed he held off the German horde until he was satisfied his company had effected its retirement. Again he loaded his gun on his back and in a hail of small arms fire he ran to a point where a few of his comrades were attempting to set up another defense against the onrushing enemy. He fired from this position until his ammunition was exhausted. Still carrying his gun, he fell back with his small group to Krinkelt. Sgt. Lopez’s gallantry and intrepidity, on seemingly suicidal missions in which he killed at least 100 of the enemy, were almost solely responsible for allowing Company K to avoid being enveloped, to withdraw successfully and to give other forces coming up in support time to build a line which repelled the enemy drive.
Was Sgt Lopez Arrested, Court Marshalled and Sentenced to Jail ? No he got also a well deserved Congressional Medal of Honor. (premeditated killing of more than 100 enemy soldiers)
Rank and organization : Sergeant, US Army, 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division. Place and date : Near Krinkelt, Belgium, 17 December 1944. (CMH)
The threat of terrorism – the senseless destruction of innocent lives and property, often times including oneself, beats every imagination. The world must unite to fight this scourge. No nation or person is protected against it. Those who feel so angry to carry out these dastardly acts defeat their own purposes because they end up killing those who may be ready to let the world hear their cases. They actually end up losing everything.
President of the Republic of Liberia
Statement to the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly
September 23, 2008, New York City
Kim Hatley’s Message
I am on a mission !
I am on a mission to get word out about my husband, (former) Infantry First Sergeant John Hatley who is highly decorated, served 20 years in the US Army, but was sentenced to prison for ‘life’ for allegedly killing four insurgents (enemy combatants) in Baghdad, Iraq at pre-surge, OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) 06-08.
This was a 15-month long deployment at one of the most violent periods in the Iraq war, each day riddled with extreme sectarian violence.
This is a case of self-defense, for the ‘detainee catch & release policy’ was yet another flawed policy, that placed our troops in danger and continues to exist to this day.
My husband did everything he could to bring his soldiers back alive. They were all like sons to him.
This deployment resulted in six of my husband’s soldiers getting killed; 2 by small arms fire and 4 by Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).
I am calling my husband a “hero,” and my pledges to keep fighting until he is released from prison. The Army says what these three soldiers did that day in Iraq was murder, pure and simple.
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Who is Kim Hatley ?
Kim is born on November 11, 1965, in Seoul, South Korea, but this is an estimated birth date since she was dropped off at an orphanage by an unknown soldier with no birth information whatsoever.
Marital status : married nearly thirteen years to John Hatley.
Education : some college courses in general studies at the University of Maryland’s European Division (Schweinfurt, Germany), maintaining a 4.0 average.
Current employment : actively seeking employment while she lives off her small savings, but she remains debt-free.
Past military service
US Army Military Intelligence – MOS (Military Occupational Specialty), she was first 96B Intelligence Analyst, she attended jump school, completed a condensed course in interrogation techniques, excelled in various leadership schools, performed well in Army physical fitness, instructed soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division at the JFK Special Warfare School Cold War, and later switched to Signals Warfare Intelligence, where she was stationed in Augsburg, Germany.
Kim’s Medals from Her Army Service
- Army Service Ribbon : enlisted personnel are awarded the ribbon after successful completion of their initial MOS producing course. Those officers or enlisted service members that are assigned to a specialty, special skill identifier, or MOS based upon civilian or other service acquired skills are awarded the Army Service Ribbon after completion of four months of honorable, active service.
- Army Lapel Button : this was an Honorable Discharge Pin given to soldiers honorably discharged. They called it a “ruptured duck” because it depicted a somewhat ungainly, potbellied eagle taking flight. There had been a common expression in WWII for anything that took off rapidly – it took off like “a ruptured duck.”
- Marksmanship Badge (Sharpshooter) : proficient at Sharpshooter level marksmanship M-16 rifle.
- Army Good Conduct Medal : the Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to a soldier whom while in active military duty set himself/herself apart from his/her comrades by exemplary conduct, efficiency, and fidelity throughout a set time of uninterrupted enlisted active military service.
- Army Commendation Medal : the Army Commendation Medal is awarded to any member, other than general officers of the Armed Forces, that distinguishes himself or herself by heroism, meritorious achievement, or meritorious service that are of a lesser degree than that required for the Bronze Star Medal.
- Parachutist Badge : awarded only after completion of US Army Airborne School.
- Army Achievement Medal : the Army Achievement Medal is awarded to any member of the military of the United States, or to any member of the military of a friendly foreign nation, who on or after 1 August 1981, while performing in any way with the Army in a non-combat field, distinguished himself/herself apart from his/her comrades by meritorious service or achievement of a lesser degree than necessary for award of the Army Commendation Medal.
- Overseas Service Ribbon (1) : the Army Overseas Service ribbon is awarded to all members of the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve in an active Reserve status after successfully completing an overseas tour—as long as there is no campaign medal for the tour for which the award is being given.
- Honorable Discharge in May 1990. Kim served a total of six years in the US Army Intelligence field.
(Comment from Gunter to whom it may concern : have you ever seen a 45 years old babe doing things like this in the middle of a German city? This gives you an idea of that strange bird and puts a question ahead : Can your business or your company afford not to have Kim in it’s Team ? Kim’s email : sorry John but I had to say this that way.)
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Terrorism and criminality are the enemies of every religion and every civilization. They would not have appeared except for the absence of the principle of tolerance.
The United Nations, New York City
November 13, 2008
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John E. Hatley
Born in Decatur, Texas in 1968
Proud parents Ann and Darryl Hatley
John has 4 sisters; Gwyn, June, Tammy and Rhonda
Graduated Army basic training in Dec 1989 (Fort Benning, Georgia)
GED, 47 semester hours at Univ of Maryland / 4.0 GPA
Achievements : Henry Caro Leadership Award, Sergeant Audie Murphy Club Member, Order of St. Maurice (Centurion level)
Achievements
Henry Caro Leadership Award: Excellence in Leadership
Sergeant Audie Murphy Club Member : Sergeant Audie Murphy Club is an elite organization of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have demonstrated performance and inherent leadership qualities and abilities characterized by those of Sergeant Audie Murphy. Sergeant Audie Murphy is the name of an NCO who, as a squad leader, consistently demonstrated the highest qualities of leadership, professionalism, and regard for the welfare of his soldiers.
Order of St. Maurice (Centurion level): This is awarded by the National Infantry Association and the Chief of Infantry of the United States Army. It is named after Saint Maurice, the leader of the Roman Theban Legion in the 3rd century. The Centurion Level is for middle-level brigade and battalion officers and NCOs and special nominees who have made an outstanding contribution to the infantry.
Awards and Decorations
Bronze Star Medal (2) : Heroism carried out under acts as described, which are of a lesser degree than those awarded of the Silver Star, will justify the award of the Bronze Star Medal.
Meritorious Service Medal (2) : It is awarded to a member of the military of the Armed Forces of the United States for having set him or herself apart from his/her comrades by outstanding non-combat meritorious achievement or service to the United States after 16 January 1969.
Valorous Unit Award : The degree of gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps necessary for the awarding of the Army Valorous Unit Award is of a lesser degree than that necessary to be awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. However, the recipient unit must have been recognized above and beyond other units participating in the same conflict for their actions under hazardous conditions in the achievement of its mission.
Army Commendation Medal (3) : The Army Commendation Medal is awarded to any member, other than General Officers, of the Armed Forces that distinguishes himself or herself by heroism, meritorious achievement or meritorious service which are of a lesser degree than that required for the Bronze Star Medal.
Army Achievement Medal (7) : The Army Achievement Medal is awarded to any member of the military of the United States, or to any member of the military of a friendly foreign nation, who, on or after 1 August 1981, while performing in any way with the Army in a non-combat field, distinguished himself/ herself apart from his/her comrades by meritorious service or achievement of a lesser degree than necessary for award of the Army Commendation Medal.
Ranger Tab : U.S. Army Ranger Training earned only after completing Ranger School.
Combat Infantryman Badge (2) : This is the U.S. Army combat service recognition decoration awarded to soldiers—enlisted men and officers (commissioned and warrant) holding colonel rank or below— who personally fought in active ground combat while an assigned member of either an infantry or a Special Forces unit, of brigade size or smaller, any time after 6 December 1941.
Expert Infantryman Badge : The EIB is presented for completion of a course of testing designed to demonstrate proficiency in infantry skills.
Parachutist Badge : Awarded only after completion of U.S. Army Airborne School.
Air Assault Badge : Awarded only after completion of U.S. Army Air Assault School.
German Marine Schützenschnur Badge (gold) : The German armed forces regulations point out that the Schützenschnur is a decoration for weapons proficiency for enlisted soldiers.
Army Service Ribbon : Enlisted personnel are awarded the ribbon after successful completion of their initial MOS producing course. Those officers or enlisted service members that are assigned to a specialty, special skill identifier, or MOS based upon civilian or other service acquired skills are awarded the Army Service Ribbon after completion of four months of honorable, active service.
Iraq Campaign Medal : The ICM is approved to recognize service members who are serving or have served in the direct support of Iraq.
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal : Individuals authorized the award of the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal must have been deployed abroad for service in the Global War on Terrorism operations on or after September 11, 2001, and to a future date to be determined.
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal : Individuals authorized the award of the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal must have participated in or served in support of Global War on Terrorism operations outside the designated areas of eligibility (AOE) on or after September 11, 2001 and to a future date to be determined.
Southwest Asia Service Medal w/Bronze Service Stars (2) : The Southwest Asia Service Medal is awarded for service in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, that portion of the Arabian Sea that lies north of 10 degrees North latitude and west of 68 degrees East longitude, as well as the total land areas of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
Saudi Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait) : The Kuwait Liberation Medal was awarded to U.S. Military personnel who participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Saudi Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi) : In order to be awarded the Kuwait Liberation Medal, you must have been a member of the United States Armed Forces and served in support of Operation Desert Storm between 17 January 1991 and 28 February 1991.
National Defense Service Medal (2) : The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces for any period between :
June 27, 1950, to July 27, 1954 (for service during the Korean War).
January 1, 1961, to August 14, 1974 (for service during the Vietnam War).
August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995 (for service during the Gulf War).
September 11, 2001, to a date to be announced (for service during the War on Terrorism).
NCO Professional Development Ribbon (3) : When successfully completing a designated Noncommissioned Officer professional development course, the service member is awarded the Noncommissioned Officer’s Professional Development Ribbon.
A numeral is attached to the ribbon to show completion of specific levels of subsequent courses. Primary level course is signified by the basic ribbon; basic level course with the number 2; advanced level course with number 3; and senior level course (Sergeants Major Academy) with number 4.
Korean Defense Service Medal : A member of the U.S. Armed Forces earned the Korean Service medal if he or she participated in combat or served with a combat or service unit within the territorial limits of Korea or in water immediately adjacent for 30 consecutive or 60 nonconsecutive days anytime between 27 June 1950, and 27 July 1954.
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal : The Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, after 1 July 1958, participate in specified United States operations or those in direct support of the United Nations or friendly foreign nations in which it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that significant numbers of personnel are placed in a position where hostile action by foreign armed forces is imminent even if it should not materialize.
Army Good Conduct Medal (5) : Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to a soldier who sets himself/herself apart from his/her comrades by exemplary conduct, efficiency, and fidelity throughout a set time of uninterrupted enlisted active military service.
Overseas Service Ribbon (5) : The Army Overseas Service ribbon is awarded to all members of the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve in an active Reserve status after successfully completing an overseas tour as long as there is no campaign medal for the tour for which the award is being given.
Kosovo Service Medal : The Kosovo Campaign Medal is authorized to members of the military service members who took part in or assisted in direct support of one or more of the Kosovo Operation(s) :
ALLIED FORCE (24 Mar through Jun 1999)
JOINT GUARDIAN (11 Jun 1999 through To Be Determined)
ALLIED HARBOUR (4 Apr through 1 Sep 1999)
SUSTAIN HOPE/SHINING HOPE (4 Apr through 10 Jul 1999)
NOBLE ANVIL (24 Apr through 20 Jul 1999)
Or the following Kosovo TASK FORCE(S) :
HAWK (5 Apr through 24 Jun 1999)
SABER (31 Mar through 8 Jul 1999)
HUNTER (1 Apr through 1 Nov 1999)
NATO Medal (2) : The NATO Medal has been approved for US Armed Service members who serve under NATO Command or operational control in direct support of NATO operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, or as determined by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), from 1 July 1992 through a future date to be determined.
Overseas Bars (5) (Combat stripes) : Tours served overseas/5 combat zones
Marksmanship Badge (expert) : Expert marksmanship with M16-A1 rifle.
(Note : The unit 1-18 Infantry has been redesignated as 1-2 IN, 172nd BCT.)
Overseas Deployments / Assignments
- 1990
Feb 101st Airborne Div Fort Campbell (Also 1st deployment to 1st Iraq war / Operation Desert Storm/Shield Iraq)
- 1992
Panama
- 1993
Camp Hovey, Korea 1-5 Cav
- 1995
Fort Hood, Texas 1-5 Cav
- 1997
(then deployed 6 months to Bosnia / Operation Joint Forge Bosnia)
- 2000
Germany B.Co. 1-18 IN ((This unit, B. Co. 1-18 Infantry has now been redesignated as : 172nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st INF Divison))
- 2001
(then deployed to Kosovo for 6 months / Operation Joint Guardian II Kosovo)
- 2003
Germany 1st IN Division G-3 Master Gunner
- 2004
Germany 1st IN Div (served as a Sergeant Major slot for Division G-3) (Then deployed to Operation Iraqi FreedomII – Tikrit, Iraq)
(While deployed to Tikrit, 6 months later took over A. Co. 1-18 while deployed to Tikrit, Iraq.)
- 2006/2008
Still the A.Co. 1-18 IN First Sergeant – (then deployed to Baghdad, Iraq for a total of 15 months)
- 2008 USAG (United States Army Garrison) Schweinfurt, Germany. Housing NCOIC (John was placed in this temporary position until the trial date approached. He immediately gained respect and admiration for his leadership abilities, strong work ethic and contagious attitude in a very unique, if not temporary position working along side civilians.)
Stateside assignments
Fort Campbell, Kentucky 101st Airborne Division
Fort Hood, Texas 1-5 Cav
John E. Hatley Family
Wife : Kim Hatley 44 (Army Veteran)
US Army Intelligence Spec-4 (6 years)
Kim currently resides in Texas
Son : Nick Hatley 20
Lance Corporal, US Marines, Cobra Attack Helicopter Mechanic
Plane Captain Level
1SG Todd Carlsrud
Almost nightly in Baghdad we conducted raids to arrest murders, IED cells, and snipers with an extremely high rate of success. We would spend weeks building target packets on these individuals, some with multiple eyewitness statements.
Task Force 1-18 arrested 837 detainees during OIF 06-08. After the raid, the patrol would secure the detainees and all evidence, and transport the detainees to the DHAA. Once at the DHAA, the frustrations began. The DHAA would not initially take detainees, during the Surge. The detention facilities did not have a fraction of the capacity to hold the higher amounts of detainees that resulted from the Surge.
Our battalion would have to assist by fighting the bureaucracy to get the detainees into the DHAA. Beyond the target packages that were with the detainees, the DHAA would require writing more sworn statements on how each individual was detained no matter if you turned in one detainee or twenty. In total, you would spend three to six hours on a raid and then eight hours at the DHAA. Two to three days after detainment the DHAA would call saying that they had lost evidence, the unit had not turned in evidence or the Interrogator had spoken with the suspect and found him to be a good upstanding Iraqi citizen.
In these instances, Battalion would fight with the DHAA to hold these detainees with the signed DHAA evidence forms and the chain of custody paperwork. The Battalion would resubmit all the paperwork multiple times to keep the detainees in custody. However, when the DHAA said the detainees had to be released, the DHAA would notify the unit to release the detainee. The detaining unit was required to go out on patrol to pick the detainee up and return him to his home.
I detained sixteen individuals in connection with an IED cell attacking logistical patrols on Route Jackson in Southern Baghdad. During the two weeks that the sixteen detainees were being held, all IEDS on Route Jackson stopped. The DHAA interrogators called Battalion and said all sixteen detainees were “upstanding citizens of the community” and were released. Three days after their release, an FA Battalion Commander lost both of his legs to an IED on Route Jackson, the same area where the sixteen detainees operated. This was a daily fight in Southern Baghdad.
How do you fight the situation of getting shot and blown up on a daily basis and then be forced to release the man who killed one of your soldiers? You try to do the right thing and arrest the individuals responsible for these attacks, knowing they will kill another soldier tomorrow. How do you combat that threat?
During OIF 6-8, A, 1-18IN was responsible for an area previously patrolled by six companies. This area was made up of over 1 million Iraqi (1.000.000) and was the second most violent sector of Baghdad at that time (pre-surge).
It was the most violent area patrolled by 1-18IN.
This sector (West Rasheed) experienced extreme sectarian violence. Attacks on American Soldiers were among the highest the war had seen, as well as attacks on fellow Iraqi’s. Several Iraqi’s being detained by US Soldiers were subsequently released, only to be detained again after engaging Soldiers again. The reasons these Iraqi’s were originally released are many and complicated.
The frustration levels, stress levels and exhaustion of our Soldiers, especially A, 1-18IN was high pre-surge. Many Soldiers patrolled the streets of West Rasheed daily, coming under attack by small arms fire or IEDs each day.
Most Soldiers averaged 4-6 hours of sleep each night. First Sergeant Hatley averaged less.
John and two other soldiers (SGT Michael Leahy and SFC Joseph Mayo) were charged with murdering 4 Iraqi detainees on one of these missions at the end of March 2007.
SGT Leahy and MSG John Hatley were found guilty of premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder, contrary to their pleas of Not Guilty to all charges. SFC Mayo pled, and was found, guilty of premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
The four men these Soldiers were convicted of murdering were never identified by name, nor were their bodies found. There was also no ballistics or forensic evidence found to support the men were killed.
John E. Hatley – Who’s that Guy ?
In January 2004 I received orders for Schweinfurt and was assigned to the 1-18 Infantry. I remained with the 1-18 through December 2007 until a PCS move to the Chaplain Advanced Course in Fort Jackson, SC. In June 2008 I was assigned to the 4/160th SOAR (A) and currently serve as their battalion chaplain. Many will tell you that M/Sgt Hatley is the best leader they have ever seen.
It is true that I have never seen anyone equal John Hatley’s ability to rally his soldiers at critical moments over and over again. I have only see one other leader (Col Jeff Sinclair) be able to build and maintain the dignity of individual soldiers regardless of rank.
My combat experience is limited to 28 months in various theaters, but I can say with confidence that few have led in conditions as demanding as M/Sgt Hatley’s during the Spring of 2007 and none took on a sense of ownership and responsibility for his men and the mission like he did.
During the Spring of 2007, the overwhelming desire for us was to get to the root of the problem, which at times looked impossible. 2nd Platoon A.Co. and Headquarters were relentless in their patrols in order to stay ahead of the violence and M/Sgt Hatley was the engine that kept pushing forward. The more we as a Battalion pushed forward to solve the problems, the more complex they appeared to be. Trying to distinguish the enemy from the civilians and tribe from tribe was only scratching the surface. To complicate matters, frustration towards the Iraqis and even anger developed, especially when we were laughed at in the streets after deadly IED explosions … Many of those in various levels of leadership were unsure of what to do, some were reaching exhaustion and simply out of ideas. M/Sgt Hatley was one of the few who tirelessly worked to solve the problems.
I remember he worked for days trying to find a sniper in one of the neighborhoods that had shot and killed at least three Iraqi females. It is known he was successful in finding the sniper or the one who killed a 14 year old boy he tried to save. But, he constantly tried and it is no surprise to me that he happened to be the only one in our Battalion who managed to find this group with sniper equipment. I believe this was possible because he was willing to work with the Iraqis and get to know them, which I believe has some bearing on the current case.
One of the reasons problem solving was so hard was because during the Spring of 2007 we received very little credible intelligence from local Iraqi citizens who were fearful for their own lives. On the night the detainees were shot, it is my understanding that an Iraqi was willing to step forward and point out where the dangerous men were in his neighborhood. Quite remarkable considering he was risking his life. The dilemma of those individuals potentially making it back onto the streets then becomes complicated. I understand that it isn’t easy to look back 2 years after the fact and make sense of what M/Sgt Hatley did, nor do I condone it, but my point is that M/Sgt Hatley was faced with competing emotions and realities.
If the detainees were released by the detention center, others would die or be hurt. Perhaps you have read 1Sgt Todd Carlsrud’s letter that he sent to you ? The detainees who were released as “upstanding citizens” from C.Co’s sector, began their attacks again and succeeded in blowing the legs off of a Lieutenant Colonel. This is exactly what M/Sgt Hatley could not bear to see happen any longer and was desperately trying to avoid. Even though John had lost confidence in the detainee system during the moments when the detainees were shot, it is important to understand that this was not a categorical rejection of our Army values or system.
During a raid conducted towards the end of the Summer, an insurgent tried to shoot SFC Wnuck in the back of the head. Thankfully, SFC Wnuck heard the click of the pistol and reacted only allowing the bullet to cut across the fingers of his hand. As I understand ROE, the soldiers would have been justified killing that insurgent in self defense, but since it was at the close of a raid, he was restrained, the weapon removed and he was detained. M/Sgt Hatley was the primary mover in that situation which ensured that the insurgent would be spared for the legal system. I think this event demonstrates that M/Sgt Hatley in spite of clouded judgment earlier in the deployment, did not maintain a cavalier attitude towards the Iraqis, but had regard for the lives of Iraqis and the legal process in place. Finally, in a conversation with me late in the deployment, he revealed that he had been in a lot of contact with the enemy over the course of his career. He was tired, not proud. It was a notable conversation to me, because it signified that he needed a change and twice he turned down the Command Sergeant’s Major Academy.
Seth H. George CPT,
US Army Battalion Chaplain
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John is a peer, mentor, and friend. In writing this letter I hope to shed some light on John’s character, beliefs, and the code he lived by as a soldier and leader. Leaders in the Army make the statement that they care more about their soldiers than themselves, but John lived by that code on a daily basis. John is the type of man who would make the ultimate sacrifice for any one of his soldiers.
John risked his life countless times to protect his soldiers without regard for his own personal safety or life. I have followed John into battle along with numerous other soldiers and would proudly follow him again. John cared for each and every soldier in his company more than he cared for himself.
M/Sgt Hatley and I have been together for sixteen years. We first met in Fort Hood, Texas in 1992 as squad leaders in 1-5 Cav. He was in Alpha Company and I was in Bravo Company. With both companies side by side we grew to know each other rather well. During that time, I learned of John’s drive to better himself and his soldiers. An example of this was when John attempted to be an Audie Murphy board member making it all the way to the Division board, to be told that he was not yet ready. John was upset because he felt like he had failed himself, his men, and his unit.
John soon picked himself up and after three additional attempts, he finally passed the Corps Audie Murphy board. John completed Ranger school in 1997 and Master Gunner School in 1998. He felt that if he was going to become a Platoon Sergeant, he needed to be proficient in all aspects of being an Infantryman.
John completed the Army’s most renowned schools to better himself and more importantly the men he would lead into combat.
In October 2001, I was stationed with John once again in 1-18 Infantry Battalion in Schweinfurt, Germany. John was a Platoon Sergeant in Bravo Company and I was a Squad leader in Alpha Company. I had an upcoming SFC promotion board and I was trying to get a senior NCO to assist me with the preparation of my promotion packet.
SFC Hatley approached me and asked me what issues I was having with my promotion packet. I explained to John that I had several questions about my promotion packet and couldn’t find a senior NCO to assist me. John told me to give him my promotion packet and come to his office the next day. When I arrived, he had reviewed my promotion packet and highlighted the areas that I needed to fix. John went above and beyond to assist me with my promotion packet to ensure I passed the SFC promotion board, which allowed me to be assigned as 2nd Platoon Sergeant in Alpha Company.
Senior Noncommissioned Officers in the Army, like John, were instrumental in developing my military career as well as my leadership qualities.
In May of 2004, M/Sgt Hatley moved to Alpha Company, 1-18 Infantry Battalion leaving the Division Master Gunner position and took over as 1Sgt.
The moment John took over the company, morale and motivation increased dramatically. As a former soldier who served in 1Sgt Hatley’s company, myself and many others wanted to be a better soldier because of John. 1Sgt Hatley turned Alpha Company into the best company in 1-18 Infantry Battalion. 1Sgt Hatley lived by a code that stated if you led from the front, soldiers would follow.
I personally patrolled with John on numerous occasions and he was always the first man into battle and the last man out. When a raid had to be conducted and the threat was high, John was there leading the assault team into the building.
On one occasion in Baghdad, a soldier found a suspected vehicle filled with explosives. John told the soldier to move away as he and I cleared the vehicle. The vehicle was in fact filled with explosives and RPG’s, but in John’s mind all he cared about was protecting his men.
John thought of his soldiers as sons and brothers. John understood the fact that soldiers sometimes get hurt or killed in battle. He would take the responsibility upon himself to take care of the dangerous situations to better protect his soldiers.
In Jan 2007, John again came to my aid. I was a SFC and I was hoping to get a job as an Infantry company First Sergeant. I was getting a little disgruntled with my job on staff and badly wanted to go back to a line company. John understood my frustrations and felt that I deserved to be a company First Sergeant of a line company. John approached the Battalion Command Sergeant Major on numerous occasions trying to help me obtain a First Sergeant position. John told the CSM that he already had three years of First Sergeant time and would be willing to pass me his company, if that is what it took to give me an opportunity.
With John’s help, on 12 January 2007, I was given a First Sergeant position in Charlie Company where I continue to serve today. With the new job came many questions but John made it easy. John’s door was always open to give advice and encouragement. John bent over backwards to ensure my success, again putting others before himself.
It is my personal belief that I understand, more than others in the Army, why John felt like he had to do what he did that day. I enlisted into the Army in July 1986 as an Infantryman. I have seen combat operations in Operation Desert Storm/Shield; two Intrinsic Actions rotations in Kuwait; Kosovo; Operation Iraq Freedom; OIF 2 in Tikrit, OIF 06-08 in Baghdad, Iraq, and now presently serving OIF 08-10 at Fob Endeavor, an Najaf, Iraq.
Life as a First Sergeant was challenging in Baghdad during OIF 06-08, although I had seen combat before, nothing can compare to the combat we experienced in Baghdad. It was guaranteed that within minutes of driving out the gate of FOB Falcon into Southern Baghdad, you would be engaged either by small arms fire (SAF), Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), or Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP).
Southern Baghdad was a sectarian battle zone, which meant you were guaranteed to find dead bodies from the previous night. Some days, I had found up to ten bodies in a single patrol. Some of the corpses were tortured and mutilated in unspeakable ways. The bodies were left in piles of trash, floating in canals, or simply left in the middle of the street, often times with dogs chewing on them.
We were required to always stop, secure the area, and police up the bodies into big blue colored body bags that looked like hefty trash bags. There was daily interaction with death in Southern Baghdad.
After securing a body you had two choices to make. First, you could wait on the Iraqi Police to come, which could take hours, which meant you would be receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the process.
Second, you could load the bloated, putrid body into your vehicle and take it to the nearest Iraqi Police checkpoint.
The Iraqis changed their tactics and started rigging the bodies with explosives or em-placed an IED nearby to hit us as we got out picking up the bodies.
After six months of policing up bodies and being attacked, we turned over the responsibility to the Iraqi Police. The police didn’t seem to care about the bodies. On one occasion, they left a body lying on the street for three weeks. The Iraqi Police drove by the body every day and never picked it up to take it to the morgue. My soldiers asked me how a human being could do that to another and behave like animals. To this day, I still do not know how to answer that question.
Almost nightly in Baghdad we conducted raids to arrest murders, IED cells, and snipers with an extremely high rate of success. We would spend weeks building target packets on these individuals, some with multiple eyewitness statements.
Task Force 1-18 arrested 837 detainees during OIF 06-08. After the raid, the patrol would secure the detainees and all evidence, and transport the detainees to the DHAA.
Once at the DHAA, the frustrations began.
The DHAA would not initially take detainees, during the Surge. The detention facilities did not have a fraction of the capacity to hold the higher amounts of detainees that resulted from the Surge. Our battalion would have to assist by fighting the bureaucracy to get the detainees into the DHAA.
Beyond the target packages that were with the detainees, the DHAA would require writing more sworn statements on how each individual was detained no matter if you turned in one detainee or twenty.
In total, you would spend three to six hours on a raid and then eight hours at the DHAA.
Two to three days after detainment the DHAA would call saying that they had lost evidence, the unit had not turned in evidence or the Interrogator had spoken with the suspect and found him to be a good upstanding Iraqi citizen. In these instances, Battalion would fight with the DHAA to hold these detainees with the signed DHAA evidence forms and the chain of custody paperwork. The Battalion would resubmit all the paperwork multiple times to keep the detainees in custody.
However, when the DHAA said the detainees had to be released, the DHAA would notify the unit to release the detainee. The detaining unit was required to go out on patrol to pick the detainee up and return him to his home. I detained sixteen individuals in connection with an IED cell attacking logistical patrols on Route Jackson in Southern Baghdad. During the two weeks that the sixteen detainees were being held, all IEDS on Route Jackson stopped. The DHAA interrogators called Battalion and said all sixteen detainees were “upstanding citizens of the community” and were released.
Three days after their release, an FA Battalion Commander lost both of his legs to an IED on Route Jackson, the same area where the sixteen detainees operated. This was a daily fight in Southern Baghdad.
How do you fight the situation of getting shot and blown up on a daily basis and then be forced to release the man who killed one of your soldiers ?
You try to do the right thing and arrest the individuals responsible for these attacks, knowing they will kill another soldier tomorrow. How do you combat that threat ?
On 6 August 2007, SPC Christopher Neiberger my gunner, soldier, and friend was killed by a seven array EFP. We had been out that morning trying to assist the Iraqi people with an issue at a gas station. Insurgents were using the gas station to extort money and kidnap Sunni Iraqis. As we left the gas station, our payback for trying to help them fix their problem, was an EFP on the side of the road. The insurgents were assisted by the Iraqi Police in the attack. As we moved a few hundred meters from the gas station my vehicle was hit, my medic was wounded, and Chris was killed.
The EFP slug pierced the turret of the vehicle, killing him instantly. Chris fell onto my soldier with his brain fluid running down on me. All I could think about was how the same people we helped every day could kill my soldiers.
Later, my thoughts changed and I wondered what I would do if I caught the people responsible for the attack. Would I kill them to avenge my soldier’s or death or would I arrest him and take him to the DHAA, where he would most likely be released. I never caught the people responsible for the attack, so I guess I will never know.
Upon returning to Germany, the Battalion invited the families who lost sons and husbands to help build a bond and assist the soldiers’ families with finding closure for their losses. Through various contributions, we raised enough money to have each family flown over for the events. Some of the families were poor and did not have enough money for hotel rooms and other personal expenses. Once again, John stepped forward to help the families of the fallen soldiers. John provided each family with several hundred dollars and daily transportation out of his own pocket, to ensure the families were cared for. On two occasions, John and I buried soldiers on the same day.
We stood side by side in the small base chapel on FOB Falcon, Iraq. We took turns conducting the final roll calls for our fallen soldiers. I remember John telling me, “all you can do is be with your soldiers, protect them as much as possible, be their leader, friend, and continue to soldier on because that is what we do.”
In the end, John and I buried eight soldiers each during OIF 06-08, a total of 23 were killed within the Battalion, more than 150 were wounded and some still carrying shrapnel with them today.
Task Force 1-18 soldiers were killed and wounded daily during the OIF 06-08 deployment in Baghdad. When I received the e-mail requesting I come back for the trial, I thought to myself, how can I do this while I am in the middle of moving 164 men across Iraq and establishing a new FOB outside of Najaf. Afterwards, I realized that I had to come back for the trial. I owed it to John for all of the help and support he had given me over the years. I know John would have come back for me if I needed him.
As I traveled back, I found one general theme; People were in shock that an American soldier could kill someone. I realized at that moment that most soldiers were not in combat arms. I realized that no one could possibly understand how that could happen unless they were there and experienced what John and I had experienced.
In 22 years, I have learned that there is a completely different mindset between Infantryman and other occupations within the Army.
While other soldiers move away from a fire fight, Infantrymen move towards the fight in order to close with and destroy the enemy. I mention this because during John’s trial I noticed that the majority of the jury was made up of John’s peers who shared the same rank but not peers who shared the combat experience.
What John did that day was not for self benefit or out of fear for his own life; it was for the love he had for his men. When we returned from Baghdad, all John wanted to do was retire, return to East Texas and become a physician’s assistant. Again, John wanted to help others because that is what John Hatley does.
Todd A. Carlsrud 1SG,
USA C Co 1-2 IN
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What Happened ?
I am currently serving a second tour, now in Dyala, so you will have to excuse the lack of signature. With the over abundance of letters being sent to you concerning these sentences I realize you may not have read my last letter with much attention. If not, I encourage you to do so and I will try to summarize the key factors of our disposition in this letter.
I was the driver of the Bradley that led our patrol to the alleged execution of the four militants we had detained earlier that day. I feel that my role in the events should be reason enough for you to pay particular attention to my letters but I would like you to also understand that as brothers in arms the members of the Wolfpack knew each other considerably well. I had the privilege of working alongside this outstanding leader and he has given me the skills and mindset a soldier needs to remain combat effective in even the most unfortunate circumstances.
I can attest to 1Sgt Hatley’s character just by writing a few short paragraphs about my time serving with him but I would first like to refresh some of the most important aspects of this case and my previous letter.
(1) The men that were killed were enemy combatants, not innocent civilians. Our patrol was engaged with small arms fire from the west side of a street in Shurta by a group of combatants that were positively identified by numerous members of our patrol including my Bradley Commander Sgt Evoy and his gunner Cpl Hupp. The identified enemy combatants were detained outside of a building one street to the west from where we were engaged. The building they were detained at was the site of a cache of weapons that included AK47s and sniper rifles with ammunition – both weapons were commonly used in attacks on coalition forces in our area.
(2) The rules of engagement and guidelines on detainee treatment were and still are in need of adjustment to allow our soldiers the necessary means to combat an insurgency. Insurgents typically hide behind our justice system. Our laws are our strength in our peaceful nation but continue to be our weakness while fighting in a war torn nation against guerrillas who not only disregard our laws but educate themselves on how to get around them. The rules of engagement currently in place are meant for conventional warfare. In our nation’s recent military history there has become a marked separation between conventional and guerrilla warfare. The Global War on Terrorism is a counterinsurgency and should be treated as such. The Detainee Holding Area was letting insurgents free due to a lack of evidence. Even positive tests for explosive along with weapons found within the vicinity of combatants were not enough to hold detainees when they were not physically caught in the act. This means that the same men were constantly in question and bettering their evasion and engagement techniques. The men that were shot that night fell into this category. It is just as important to understand the reasons why our fellow soldiers chose to take these enemy combatants out of the fight as it is to understand the characters of the men who chose to do it.
I believe that when the public understands the thought process that led to this decision they will also understand that the lives taken that night were not taken in any way that should render a punishment to a soldier in a time of war. At first glance, 1Sgt Hatley seemed to be rather rough until you got to know or work for him. In very little time, one could recognize his open mind and strong heart. He always made sure that the men of his company were accepted by one another regardless of beliefs or hobbies. He required his men to do the job given to them beyond expectations and to be strong enough (physically, mentally, and emotionally) to stand up for what they believed in. It did not matter how socially awkward some of us were or that one or two of us never learned to throw a baseball. He did not hold grudges based on previous administrative action that soldiers may have had on them. If a soldier worked hard for him and stayed true to his brothers while he was in 1Sgt Hatley’s formation then that soldier had a place under 1Sgt Hatley’s care and the care of every soldier who was in his company.
There was no question about whose company I wanted to be a part of during my time with the 1st battalion 18th Infantry Regiment. The Wolfpack had a knack for creating an outstanding performance when given little to work with. We were also well known for following the “work hard, play harder” rule and easily laughed away the stress of rigorous training and long days spent in combat. The source of many of our stress release techniques, whether it was a game of football or just a few good jokes, was often times 1Sgt Hatley. Even more importantly is the care that was given to you from his peers and superiors.
The men that 1Sgt Hatley followed seemed to have a deep respect for him. CSM Choudri once told me that although 1Sgt Hatley was one of his subordinates, he would often times adjust himself in ways that would mimic 1Sgt Hatley’s leadership. I think it is important to learn from and have the support of both those above your rank and those below. Equally, the same could be said about his peers.
Recently, a few of us have had a difficult time adjusting to new leadership and when the opportunity has arisen to change companies, “John’s boys” have been hot on the market. There are a couple 1Sgt’s that have said they would be glad to take one of “John’s boys”. The reach of 1Sgt Hatley and the Wolfpack’s care went much further then the soldiers of our battalion. Everyone in West Rashid knew who the men of the Wolfpack were, though they seldom saw our faces. As the main fighting force in a large and busy urban war, our time on the FOB was often times just long enough for a nap and a sandwich to go. But somehow, in between all the combat patrols – and sometimes even logistical movements – we found a way to help whoever needed it.
Units called on us to lighten their guard schedule on our time off and so we did. Soft units needed our Bradleys and their crewmen to help even the fight against fast moving insurgents with mortars and RPG’s. In between patrols, we gave our assistance. New troops coming in with the famed “Surge” needed outposts to base their operations from. So we built and guarded them in between our regular patrols. We were a constant unofficial QRF for any patrol who detained more than three people and needed the Bradleys to help move them. We supported patrols when they were overwhelmed by complex attacks while traveling through our sector.
If anything happened in our sector, 1Sgt Hatley had his hands out to help and the Wolfpack came with him. It sometimes angered me that so much was required of us until I finally understood that 1Sgt Hatley was not offering his help to please anybody. Nor was he trying to beef up his stats. He understood the responsibility of having the men that he helped form. We were capable of anything and ready for everything and that meant lending our hand to anybody who needed it.
The Wolfpack followed him because we saw how true he was to everyone he came in contact with. We wanted to be warriors fighting for an overall good instead of soldiers fighting blindly. We followed him into battle because we chose to follow his strong heart. Even in the military, we are not forced to follow our superiors whole heartedly. When we do not agree with who is leading us we can hide from them. We can choose not to work as hard. We can pretend not to be intelligent enough to handle a task.
The Wolfpack was not made of soldiers who hid from 1Sgt Hatley. It was made of soldiers who chose to give him their service. We all wanted to work for him because time after time he proved his honor, loyalty, integrity, competency, and proficiency.
During his trial I was worried that he may be angry at me for the truth I was forced to tell. I should have known better. Even after some of my testimony was used by the prosecution, he has opened his heart to forgive me simply because he would rather one of his boys tell the truth.
He displayed the tremendous amount of character within him by a wink and a handshake. While standing outside the courtroom during a recess from the opening arguments, he wanted to know how my mother and I were doing. In the military, good leaders are often marked by their ability to follow the influence and rules set by those above them. In life, great leaders are born with an instinctive knowledge of when to lead their followers through a necessary change of the normal. If we are good military leaders we will accept John’s conviction and sentence. We will let him live out his days in a prison because he clearly violated the rules that govern our Army. We can, however, choose to be great people and support John’s decision to do what the rules of conventional warfare do not let us do as soldiers in a conventional army. We can help change the rules to allow our soldiers the flexibility to adapt to our growing number of ruthless guerrilla enemies in the same way our patrol did that night. It is imperative that we learn to trust the strong minds and hearts of the warriors our great nation is generating.
Being a part of this whole situation has made me question the future of our nation. It is not easy to watch your brothers lose their lives in combat. It is even harder to watch your brothers lose their lives during their dwell time for taking necessary action to protect themselves during war.
Three of the best infantry soldiers to have ever pounded boots in this war are now the most decorated privates in the army. Having known these men personally, I trust that their decision was a necessary adjustment to the rules in place that have long needed adjustment. Who better to understand how to change the rules than those who have spent their adult lives following them? As I did in my last letter addressed to you for Leahy’s clemency, I urge you to have the highest amount of mercy on 1Sgt Hatley as your rank can allow. Although I am pleased that Leahy and Mayo will be given the chance for parole in 6 years, I am disappointed that their integrity is still in question. It is my understanding that there is yet another appeals process and I intend to be a part of it.
If you actually found the time to read my letters, I thank you for your time and I am elated that you found the court’s decision was in need of a balance of power. I can only hope that you do the same for John Hatley.
In Omnia Paratus
Sincerely
Spc Justin LaManna
I believe in the United States of America, as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign Nation of many sovereign States; a perfect union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice, and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes.
I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it, to support its Constitution, to obey its laws, to respect its flag, and to defend it against all enemies.
SFC (P) Gutierrez, Martin
TF 1-2 IN
BN Master Gunner
My name is SFC (P) Martin Gutierrez. I first met John E. Hatley in OIF II when he assumed duties as the company 1/Sgt for Alpha Company 1-18. I was serving as a Weapons Squad Leader in 1st Platoon and had heard of John prior to him taking over as 1/Sgt and was not really sure what to expect. Make no mistake and leave no doubt that when John enters a room it’s much like the impression he leaves in a person’s life after meeting him. You will never forget that moment and what kind of person he is. I have had the privilege to serve along his side for two Combat Deployments both OIF II and OIF 06-08. I was the Platoon Sergeant for 1st Platoon Aco 1-18 during OIF 06-08.
I agree whole heartedly with 1/Sgt Hatley’s statement “To have your honor and courage questioned by so many people that have never had theirs tested” is a tremendous burden to bear. During OIF II we stepped out and faced a very smart and determined enemy on a daily basis. You lived your life in fear every second that you were awake wondering if the last phone call home would be the last time you heard your loved ones voices. There are not words to describe how it felt or how it feels to live your life in fear. You find yourself doing strange things subconsciously like only using one hand to do things in the mind set of if I get an arm blown off tomorrow I all ready know how to manage with one.
We as leaders were given what at the time seemed an impossible mission. To bring peace and stability to a place that was full of hatred and evilness around every corner. The men of Alpha Company are some of the best America has to offer and I am privileged and honored to be able to write this letter to you today to hopefully shed some perspective on what those great Heroes went through. Alpha Company took an area previously assigned to a Brigade and with in months decreased hostile actions by at least 40%. That is no small feat and was paid for in American Blood.
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It is a life altering event when you have to pick up pieces of your own soldier and then gather your self seconds later in order to chase down a trigger man and face your soldiers and keep them in the fight long enough to make it back inside the wire. You build a bond during those tragic moments and it is stronger than anything any one could fathom. We all had our families back home, but out there amongst the enemy your family was to your left and right side by side with you. There is no doubt in any ones mind that when the bullets are flying your brother next to you would do what it took to ensure we took the fight back to the enemy no matter the cost. It is an experience that no one should have to bear, but there are few of us who do it gladly and with out hesitation so that our loved ones back home don’t have to. That is the caliber of soldiers 1/Sgt Hatley led, mentored and inspired.
Any one can lead a soldier into combat but a true leader inspires his men to do the unimaginable with out hesitation. 1/Sgt John Hatley was that leader and inspired me to be that kind of leader as well. Sir if you could imagine for a moment 125 degree temperatures, 65 to 85 pounds of equipment on your shoulders for hours on end walking the streets of volatile Baghdad clearing hundreds of houses, coming back off patrol after doing that for about six to eight hours, turning right back around and going out as a Quick Reaction Force because one of the other Platoons was in contact. Soldiers in Alpha Company did that day in and day out for 15 months with out question not because they had to or were ordered to, but because they were compelled to honor the fallen and be there for the living. I say that 1/Sgt Hatley led because that is what he was. A consummate professional who led from the front no matter what the situation was. 1/Sgt and I didn’t see eye to eye most of the time and I’m sure if you spend five minutes with him and asked him about me he would tell you that I was as hard headed and head strong as he. Although most outsiders that didn’t know us would think we hated each other it was quite the contrary. I respect him and look up to him as one of the best leaders I have had the privilege to work with and would follow him into the depths of hell and back if asked to.
I guess what I am trying to convey is that even though we may have had personality conflicts he never let that deter him from mentoring me and ensuring that my Platoon was taken care of to the best of his ability. That was the kind of person he was. On a personal note, during the deployment my wife was placed on bed rest due to pregnancy complications. At the time I was really unable to take emergency leave and did not currently have a family care plan in place to take care of my 5 year old son at the time. 1/Sgt Hatley was willing to give up his R&R with his family just so that I could go home and take care of my family and get things set up and come back and still go on R&R when my daughter was due to be born. That is the caliber man that he is. The Phrase Selfless Service does not give justice to what 1/Sgt did on a day to day basis for the Soldiers of Alpha Company. The list goes on and on I could fill these pages with numerous occasions of his dedication to help a fellow soldier stemming from letting a newly assigned soldier borrow his car until that soldiers car arrived to shelling out money from his own pocket to ensure a soldier could go home on leave or buy groceries for their family.
“People sleep peacefully at night only because brave men stand ready to do violence on their behalf” – George Orwell …
Facts – Comparison and Achievements
US Army Boss Middle East
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OEF – CC & COS Stanley A. McChrystal Gen McChrystal is a General in the United States Army. He was the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander of US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). He previously served as Director, Joint Staff from August 2008 to June 2009 and as Commander, Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008, where he was credited with the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
S2/S3 (Intelligence/Operations)
Army Special Operations Action Officer
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Barry Soetoro (aka Barack Obama)
Commander in Chief
United States Armed Forces
Birthplace : Location remains questionable
Proof of United States Citizenship hasn’t been provided
Education : Columbia University, Harvard Law School
- Records never produced, attendance remains questionable
Military Career : None
Business Career : None
Political Career :
- Community organizer, Chicago, 1983-86
- Civil rights attorney, Chicago, 1991-96
- University of Chicago, assistant lecturer, early 1990s-2004
- State Senator, 1996-2005
- US Senator, 2005-2008
- President 2008-2010
This is as true in everyday life as it is in battle : we are given one life and the decision is ours whether to wait for circumstances to make up our mind, or whether to act, and in acting, to live.
The world is in a constant conspiracy against the brave. It’s the age-old struggle : the roar of the crowd on the one side, and the voice of your conscience on the other.
I have been up to see the Congress and they do not seem to be able to do anything except to eat peanuts and chew tobacco, while my army is starving.
Maj Gen Paul Vallely
Men have fought wars throughout the annals of history. Americans have known wars since the birth of the nation with aspirations that set our people apart from all others. These lofty aspirations have tested our people in wars to preserve our freedom with decades of domestic strife to make good our claims to the cause of human freedom. Within the brief span of two centuries, Americans have fought wars to fulfill a destiny defined by our Founding Fathers. Each conflict has tested our courage while shaping our identity which stands apart from the Western Civilization that is our heritage. The struggle to endure and preserve our ideals – the love of freedom and the dedication to self-government – has made us unique and has made America an example that inspires mankind.
Today, we find ourselves in a difficult and new kind of war. It is a war that we did not start nor can we end without destroying those who have declared war upon us. Unique to our experience, we find ourselves attacked by assailants who wear no uniform and claim allegiance to no sovereign state and follow a barbaric radical ideology.
The assailants aspire to world domination and wage war to destroy the very aspirations of freedom and democracy. The jihadis and their cells conceal themselves within civil populations that provide human shields to these radical zealots that follow a barbaric ideology that takes no prisoners. Their mode of conflict strikes at the values we hold sacred, while they use our aspirations and self-restraint to conceal and protect their assassins. It is a war that tests our men and women in combat more severely than any conflict we have waged before.
We have attempted to keep the faith and honor our traditions as well as our noble culture of freedom. In this time of bitter war, the Armed Forces impose strict rules of engagement upon our soldiers as they confront the barbarism of the radical jihadists who exercise absolutely no restraint. No crime is too heinous and no act of treachery too despicable to deter their quest of victory and ultimately world conquest (The Caliphate).
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In former times, our soldiers have fought on even terms against foes who in many ways shared our commitment to international law and the Geneva Conventions. Such conflict recognized basic human rights and sought to punish those who violated the “Law of Land Warfare”. Such conflicts saw humane treatment of prisoners as the rule and atrocities were the exception. Yet in the bitterest struggles of World War II, the “greatest generation” resorted to retaliation for unprovoked air attacks upon British civilians that resulted in massive bombing attacks of civilian targets in the Third Reich.
Were we to use such tactics today to obliterate the sanctuaries of the enemies, as we did in World War II, the cry of the international media and the United Nations would be filled with outrage at the American combatants ? And the United Nations, which we formed at the end of World War II to preserve peace, would side with our enemies openly declaring the American combatants as war criminals. It is fair to say that we live with double standards today that are ignored by the international media and nation-states that support global jihad.
Americans are trained and expected to conduct themselves with the utmost restraint complying with the most humane rules of engagement, standards of conduct that are simply ignored by jihadis. Are we asking too much of our troops ? The answer is YES ! They must fight the enemy with great restraint and even the appearances of transgression of the rules of engagement by Americans are punished most severely by our own senior military leaders and courts-martial. The current Navy SEALS courts-martial is a prime example.
Another case of restrictive rules of engagement occurred in Afghanistan that resulted in a threatened courts-martial and follow on action of asking him to leave the Army. They decided to downgrade everything to an Article 15 and allowed him to resign his commission. He was one of our finest young warriors who discovered that their Afghan comrades were enemy agents providing valuable intelligence to the enemy. The results of the enemy agents sequestered in the base of an American company resulted in a series of ambushes that killed and wounded numerous soldiers of the 101st Air Assault Division.
The Company Commander, Captain Roger Hill, detained the suspected agents and requested they be evacuated by his higher headquarters which request was denied. Given the limited time detainees are allowed to be held without charges and the lack of support from his superiors, Captain Hill and his subordinates interrogated the detainees. While no detainee was physically injured during the interrogations, Captain Hill was charged with violation of the rules of engagement for making verbal threats during his interrogations.
Another case is that of Marine Sgt (now Private) Larry Hutchins, now serving 11 years in Leavenworth for following orders on a covert “Snatch and Kill” operation in Iraq. When intelligence provides information on civilians who are complicit in setting IED’s the best way to avoid collateral damage is to “surgically” remove them. The problem then arises when other civilians file charges and our Government plays the politically correct game of hanging our own out to dry.
- Master John Hatley is another example :
US Army Master Sergeant John E. Hatley was sentenced (initially) to Life in prison for the alleged killing of four unidentified insurgents.
OIF-06-08 to Iraq was his 3rd deployment. John was only 6 months shy of retiring, having served his country for almost 20 years with an exemplary military track record and was highly decorated. MSG Hatley as well as SFC Joseph Mayo and Sgt. Michael Leahy Jr. are confined together at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas … Their web sites follow.
MSG John Hatley
SFC Joseph P. Mayo
SGT Michael P. Leahy Jr.
A War Criminal is someone who kill for the fun of killing innocent victims and not a Soldier who kill to save the life of Brothers in Arms
Heroes to be released and sent back to save other lifes
(Source Linda Michaud-Wehunt)
1. SGT Michael P. Leahy Jr. # 87356
1300 N Warehouse Rd Fort Leavenworth KS 66027-2304
2. Master Sergeant John E. Hatley #87613
1300 N. Warehouse Road Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2304
3. SFC Joseph P. Mayo # 87525
1300 N. Warehouse Road Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2304
4.1st Lieutenant Michael Behenna #87503
1300 N. Warehouse Road Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2304
5. Pfc Corey Claggett #82477
1300 N. Warehouse Road Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2304
6. SGT. Evan Vela Carnahan #84486
1300 N. Warehouse Road Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2304
7. SPC William B Hunsaker #82476
1300 N Warehouse Rd Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027
8. Christopher Drotleff #55357
Chesapeake Correctional Center (Civilian)
400 Albemarle Drive Chesapeake, VA. 23322
9. Michael S Wagnon Box 339536
Joint Base Lewis McChord Wa 98433
10. SGT. Justin Boyle PO Box 305
Fort Sill, OK 73503
Given the uneven playing field upon which our the jihadis are waging war and the barbaric IED attacks our soldiers are subjected to, it is time for a public debate regarding the double standards that bind our hands in battle. Any actions we take will not impose any restraint upon the enemy.
The bottom line is we must support our valiant American fighting men and women. They are fighting under the most difficult conditions and they are being second guessed by military lawyers (JAGs) and bureaucrats holding down desk jobs secure in the rear areas. Our generation will never succeed in protecting our sacred freedoms unless we are prepared to back our men and women on the battlefield. Stand behind our men in battle or kiss our democracy and freedoms goodbye. We must do all we can as to restore the honorable status of our Warriors.
Our Armed Forces deserve better. The President needs to pardon our Warriors NOW.
Paul E. Vallely
Maj Gen US Army (Retired)
Chairman of Stand Up America, USA
Be Deployed to War but Don’t Shot or You”l be Jailed
1 Things to handle : the value of a human life, left the insurgents, right the US Troops
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Snipers at the Minaret – What Is the Rule ?
The Law of War and the Protection of Cultural Property :
A Complex Equation – Geoffrey S. Corn – International Law Advisor
Office of The Judge Advocate General
International and Operational Law Division
On 2 January 2005, the Washington Post ran an article entitled “For US Solders, A Frustrating and Fulfilling Mission.”
(1) That article included a photograph with the following caption : “US Army snipers took over the top of this nearly 1,200 year-old spiral minaret at a Samarra mosque after the streets below became the scene of frequent attacks by insurgents in the restless city.”
(2) The article also stated that : Soldiers occupy this vantage point 24 hours a day, working in pairs for 12 hours at a time. An intersection below had become the scene of almost incessant attacks, and American commanders decided that placing snipers with .50-caliber rifles and powerful scopes in this circle of stone 10 feet in diameter, 180 feet above the ground, could deter insurgents.
(3) The characterization of this operational vantage point as a 1,200 year old minaret or mosque clearly raises concerns that this object falls within the category of cultural property. Assuming this minaret does in fact satisfy the definition of protected cultural property, was its use as a vantage point improper ?
The initial answer appears to be “no.”
In fact, the use may very well have been permissible. The equation that must be used to reach that answer is complex, and reflects the challenge of the source, scope, and effect of law of war-related proscriptions in the current operational environment. The purpose of this article is to use this incident to illustrate several of the legal issues related to determining the appropriate “rule of decision” for the employment of means and methods of warfare within the context of current combat operations.
The Legal Equation
The minaret incident highlights a number of operational law issues, almost all of which transcend analysis of this specific issue. These issues include the impact of the status of the conflict on the analysis of applicable rules of decision; the impact of Department of Defense (DOD) policy related to the law of war on the same issue; domestic legal principles related to the applicability of treaty obligations; and ultimately, the specific law of war rules related to the use of religious and cultural property for military purposes. Each of these issues is addressed below. Impact of Conflict Status on Legal Analysis Perhaps the most complex issue related to analysis of this situation is determining the applicable law of war obligations. Resolution of this issue requires determining whether the conduct occurred during the course of an armed conflict within the meaning of international law, and if so, the nature of that conflict. These determinations will dictate whether, as a matter of law, the law of war is applicable to the situation, and if so, what provision of that law provides the relevant rule of decision.
The question of whether military operations in Iraq qualify as an armed conflict under international law, and if so, whether that armed conflict is an international armed conflict has become far more complex since the establishment of the interim government of Iraq on 28 June 2004. Before that date, there was a general consensus that military operations in Iraq qualified as an international armed conflict consistent with the standard reflected in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, either as a result of conflict or belligerent occupation.
The initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly involved hostilities between the armed forces of the United States and Iraq. A period of belligerent occupation followed the conclusion of major combat operations. During these phases, the full range of law of war provisions applied to the conduct of military operations by US forces. The establishment of the interim Iraqi government marked a restoration of Iraqi sovereign authority and a termination of belligerent occupation. While this shift in authority had minimal impact on the nature of the operations conducted by US and multi-national forces in Iraq, it did, arguably, result in removing military operations in Iraq from the rubric of international armed conflict.
Although US and multi-national forces continued (and continue) to conduct combat operations in Iraq, these operations were not directed against the armed forces of Iraq, or even against militia groups or volunteer groups forming a part of those armed forces. Instead, they were, and remain, directed against armed dissident groups opposed to both the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq and the Iraqi government. In addition, the transfer of sovereignty back to an Iraqi government ostensibly terminated, from a formal legal perspective, the period of belligerent occupation, even though US and Coalition forces continued to perform many of the military functions associated with that occupation. No matter how similar the tasks and missions may be to those conducted during belligerent occupation, the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty, and the absence of conflict between the armed forces of Iraq and Coalition forces, are the decisive factors in analyzing the nature of the conflict in Iraq.
If the conclusion that the situation in Iraq no longer qualifies as an international armed conflict is valid, it leads to the question of whether an armed conflict continues in Iraq, and if so, whether it qualifies for any law of war regulation. It seems logically and factually justified to conclude that armed conflict, within the meaning of international law, continues in Iraq. The regular armed forces of Iraq, the United States, and multi-national forces continue to conduct large scale military operations against highly organized, armed dissident groups. This situation appears to fall within the rubric of a conflict not of an international character to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions refers, which reflects the customary international law standard for triggering the law of war applicable to such conflicts.
Reference to the ICRC commentary to the Geneva Conventions supports this conclusion : “Cases of armed conflict.”
What is meant by “armed conflict not of an international character”? The expression is so general, so vague, that many of the delegations feared that it might be taken to cover any act committed by force of arms – any form of anarchy, rebellion, or even plain banditry … these different conditions, although in no way obligatory, constitute convenient criteria, and we therefore think it well to give a list drawn from the various amendments discussed; they are as follows :
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory.
Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfill any of the above conditions ? We do not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the scope of application of the Article must be as wide as possible. There can be no drawbacks in this, since the Article in its reduced form, contrary to what might be thought, does not in any way limit the right of a State to put down rebellion, nor does it increase in the slightest the authority of the rebel party. It merely demands respect for certain rules, which were already recognized as essential in all civilized countries, and embodied in the national legislation of the States in question, long before the Convention was signed …
Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with ‘armed forces’ on either side engaged in ‘hostilities’ – conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country.
The situation in Iraq, however, includes certain characteristics that were not contemplated at the time Common Article 3 was developed, and arguably not even when the Protocol II’s triggering standard for internal armed conflict was developed. Secifically, the participation in the ongoing conflict of members of international terrorist groups, ostensibly devoted not to any change of government in Iraq, but simply to killing Coalition forces and destabilizing Iraq, renders analysis of the nature of the conflict extremely difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by the links between these groups and transnational terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. Further complicating the analysis is the United States’ characterization of the fight against terrorism as a “Global War,” invoking the inherent right of self-defense reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations – a right normally associated with conflict between sovereign states. These unusual aspects of the conflict in Iraq point to two potentially divergent conclusions :
that the terrorist nature of the enemy removes the conflict from the realm of law of war regulation altogether;
or
that the international character of the same terrorist organizations, and the US war against them, place military operations into the category of international armed conflict.
From a policy perspective, there is no indication that the original US characterization of operations in Iraq as falling into the category of international armed conflict has been “downgraded.” In addition, as will be discussed below, application of DOD policy related to the law of war renders this issue somewhat irrelevant due to the requirement to treat all armed conflicts as “international” for the purpose of law of war applicability. Nonetheless, as was noted in such a pointed manner by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in United States v. Noriega, policy established by the executive branch is always subject to modification, whereas law is not, and therefore determining binding legal standards is never truly obviated by a policy-based application of those standards.
The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
The government has thus far obviated the need for a formal determination of General Noriega’s status. On a number of occasions as the case developed, counsel for the government advised that General Noriega was being and would continue to be afforded all of the benefits of the Geneva Convention. At no time was it agreed that he was, in fact, a prisoner of war.
The government’s position provides no assurances that the government will not at some point in the future decide that Noriega is not a POW, and therefore not entitled to the protections of Geneva III. This would seem to be just the type of situation Geneva III was designed to protect against. Because of the issues presented in connection with the General’s further confinement and treatment, it seems appropriate – even necessary – to address the issue of Defendant’s status. Articles 2, 4, and 5 of Geneva III establish the standard for determining who is a POW. Must this determination await some kind of formal complaint by Defendant or a lawsuit presented on his behalf? In view of the issues presently raised by Defendant, the Court thinks not.
In the opinion of this author, the conflict against Al Qaeda is simply an armed conflict, regulated by what might be regarded as original fundamental principles of the law of war. This theory is based on the belief that the historic trigger for basic law of war principles was the international legal analogue of what was traditionally characterized as war, which was simply “armed conflict.” In the opinion of this author, as a matter of historical custom, when armed forces engaged in such armed conflict, they carried with them the fundamental principles of the law of war, both permissive and restrictive. As a result, they invoked the principle of military necessity, providing authority to take all measures not forbidden by international law necessary to achieve the prompt submission of their opponents; and they were constrained by the basic principle of humanity, as understood in historical context.
This “basic principle” concept was clearly strained during the years between the first and second World Wars. During this period, brutal internal conflicts in Spain, Russia, and China challenged the customary expectation that forces engaged in armed conflict would conduct themselves in accordance with basic principles of the law of war. This perceived failure of international law to provide effective regulation for non-international armed conflicts was the primary motivation underlying the creation of Common Article 3. It is somewhat misleading, however, to suggest that Common Article 3 was “necessary” to ensure compliance with basic principles during such conflicts. Common Article 3 might instead be legitimately viewed as a fail-safe to provide the international community a basis to demand compliance with such principles when armed forces refuse to comply with the customary standards of conduct related to any military operation involving the use of force.
Indeed, even Common Article 2 appears to have been a response to a failure of the traditional expectation that armed forces engaged in “war” between states would acknowledge applicability of the law of war. The rejection of “war” as a trigger for the law of war in favor of “armed conflict” was an attempt to prevent what might best be described as “bad faith avoidance” of compliance with the customary standards related to the jus in bello. The qualifier of “international” was, as indicated in the ICRC Commentary, an effort to emphasize that specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions were triggered by armed conflicts conducted under state authority. As that same commentary indicates, however, it is the “armed conflict” nature of military operations that distinguish them – and the law that regulates them – from law enforcement activities.
It is clear that the global war on terror (GWOT) has strained traditional application of the Common Article 2 and Common Article 3 triggers for law of war application. Perhaps, however, these articles have been misinterpreted as the exclusive triggers for law of war application. While they clearly serve as triggers for application of the treaty provisions of the treaties they relate to, these provisions might be better understood as a layer of regulation augmenting the fundamental principles of the law of war triggered by any armed conflict. In short, whenever an armed force engages in conflict operations, fundamental principles of military necessity and humanity are triggered by those operations. When such operations also satisfy the criteria of Common Article 2, these principles become augmented by the provisions of the conventions triggered by such a conflict. With regard to the trigger of Common Article 3, operations falling within the traditional definition of internal armed conflict would unquestionably be regulated by the substance of that article. The basic principles reflected in Common Article 3, however, are redundant with the basic principles of humanity triggered by any armed conflict, and therefore the substantive effect of such a conclusion would be de minimis. In contrast, however, failure to satisfy the Common Article 3 trigger – even when armed forces were engaged in conflict operations (such as operations conducted against non-state actors operating outside the territory of the state targeting those actors) – would not undermine application of the same basic principles.
It is interesting to consider the relationship of this theory with the traditional policy of the United States regarding the law of war. It has been the longstanding policy of the DOD to treat any armed conflict as the trigger for application of the law of war. This policy has been the foundation for law of war application during every phase of the GWOT, and reflects the basic proposition that armed conflict equals application of basic principles of the law of war, no matter how that conflict is characterized. Perhaps this “policy” is actually a reflection of an underlying norm of customary international law.
From a pragmatic perspective, in order to emphasize the unique nature of the armed conflict ongoing against trans-national terrorist organizations, and distinguish it from the traditionally acknowledged categories of “international” armed conflict and “internal” armed conflict – it might be useful to adopt the characterization of “trans-national armed conflict.” It is important to emphasize that with the “armed conflict” theory outlined above, this “trans national” qualifier is more a reflection of the nature of the operations and not essential for triggering basic law of war principles. It is the armed conflict nature of the operations that results in application of these basic principles.
Nonetheless, characterizing the GWOT as a “trans-national” armed conflict seems justified by a careful analysis of the underlying humanitarian rationale of Common Article 3, the history of armed conflicts since 1949, and the fundamental purpose of the law of armed conflict. For purposes of determining the scope of regulation, such conflicts fall, as a matter of customary international law, within the category of conflicts regulated by the principles reflected in Common Article 3. This does not, however, reflect a purely internal nature of such trans-national armed conflicts.
Instead, the application of the “armed conflict” triggering criteria emphasized in the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 3 is relevant exclusively to determining the scope of law of war regulation, because it reflects a recognition that the nature of such conflicts falls outside the accepted definition of an international armed conflict for purposes of determining the scope and extent of law of war regulations, as such conflicts require a dispute between two entities satisfying the accepted criteria for statehood.
In determining the validity of this category of armed conflicts, it is critical to note that the source of this “triggering” standard for the baseline principle of humane treatment (and, by inference, military necessity) that should apply to any armed conflict (dispute requiring the intervention of armed forces), as reflected in Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, does not use the phrase “internal armed conflict.” Instead, Common Article 3 imposes upon the parties to a “conflict not of an international character,” an obligation to treat all persons not participating or no longer participating in the conflict humanely. Common Article 3 reads as follows : “In the case of armed conflict not of an international character …”
Virtually every non-international armed conflict that has occurred during the later half of the twentieth century involved trans-national characteristics – ranging from the use of adjacent territories for safe-haven to the receipt of active logistics, training, and command and control support obtained from neighboring states. Indeed, even the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939, which served as a major motivation for the development of Common Article 3, involved substantial trans-national aspects in the form of arm, equip, train, and even voluntary participation programs executed by Germany and Italy (on behalf of the Nationalists) and the Soviet Union (on behalf of the Republicans).
Additionally, in the two seminal international tribunal cases analyzing the relationship between internal and international armed conflicts, the issue of external involvement and sponsorship was addressed and determined not to transform these conflicts from non-international to international. As a result, and due to the expanding nature of such operations within the broader context of the GWOT, it is essential to carefully assess the customary meaning of the term “conflicts not of an international character” for purpose of determining applicable provisions of the law of war. In so doing, the following considerations are useful : the interpretive guidance provided by the ICRC Commentary; the humanitarian rational underlying application of baseline standards to military operations not involving two opposing state entities; and US practice with regard to the scope of Common Article 3. The GPW Commentary notes that there is no objective set of criteria for determining the existence of an armed conflict not of an international character. The Commentary, however, states : Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities – conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country.
This excerpt from the Commentary clearly refers to what is traditionally regarded as “internal” armed conflicts. This reference, however, need not be treated as dispositive. It is reasonable to consider this quotation as a reflection of the historical context in which the provision was drafted, which is also manifested by the suggestion that Common Article 3 would only apply when “the party in revolt has an organized military force under responsible command, operating within a determinate territory, and has the means of respecting the GC.”
The actual provision it seeks to explain is written in much broader terms, a practice not uncommon with provisions of multi-lateral treaties, often intended to provide interpretive flexibility. What seems clear from the ICRC Commentary is that the drafters were attempting to respond to the need to ensure some international legal regulation of activities that rose to the level of “armed conflicts,” even if such conflicts did not take on a “international” character, while mitigating fears that Common Article 3 would be applied to internal events that did not rise to the level of conflicts, thereby serving as an unjustified basis for intrusion into state sovereignty.
There is absolutely no indication that the drafters of Common Article 3 considered conflicts between the regular armed forces of a state and a transnational non-state actor entity. In this regard, however, it is useful to consider what is often regarded as the most effective “interpretive aid” provided by the ICRC Commentary : that the line between an internal disturbance immune from international regulation and a conflict requiring international regulation is crossed when “the legal government is obliged to resort to the regular military forces to combat the party in revolt.” This interpretive aid indicates that the nature of the military activities, and not the locale, is most instructive on the applicability of international regulation to any given military operation.
This focus seems to transcend operations that were historically considered purely “internal,” and provides a logical analytical justification for determining when the limited law of war regulation associated with Common Article 3 should be applied to military operations. There is also no doubt that Common Article 3 was motivated by a perceived need to interject some limited humanitarian regulation into the realm of “internal” conflicts. It is improper to conclude, however, that because the contextual motivation for this monumental development in the regulation of armed conflict was “internal” conflicts, the fundamental goal of ensuring a baseline of humanitarian regulation of armed conflict falling somewhere below the threshold of Common Article 2 should be restricted to conflicts totally confined to the internal territory of a nation state. Instead, it was the desire to inject law of war application to any situation rising above the threshold of domestic law enforcement activity and into the realm of military armed conflict that justifies the recognition of the trans-national armed conflict standard.
It is clear from a review of the ICRC Commentary that the desire to interject some limited humanitarian regulation into a realm of activities historically shielded from international regulation served as the motivating drive behind inclusion of Common Article 3 into the four Conventions. Indeed, it was the almost “self evident” legitimacy of requiring such limited humanitarian respect in such conflicts that served as the logical basis for the international regulation of events solely within the sphere of state sovereignty. In this respect, Common Article 3 can be regarded as somewhat of an extension of the principle that absent applicable treaty provisions, individuals effected by conflict remain under the protection of the principles of humanity. This principle is reflected in the “Martens” Clause,” which was first included in the Preamble of the Hague Convention of 1899 and has been replicated in subsequent law of war treaties and statutes.
[I]n cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. The “Martens Clause” took its name from Fyodor Martens, the Russian diplomat responsible for first proposing the language during the first World Peace Conference in The Hague in 1899. The continuing validity of this clause in the analysis of protections applicable during armed conflicts was most recently confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
It would therefore appear consistent with this history to embrace a scope of application that focused on the nature of the activities, and the derivative need to provide for some limited international regulation when operations rise to the level of military conflict, and not the locale of the opposition group, in determining whether to classify an operation as a “common article 3 conflict.”
United States practice with regard to the scope of Common Article 3 also tends to support a broad application of this baseline standard of conflict regulation. On 29 January 1987, President Reagan transmitted Protocol II to the Senate for its advice and consent. With certain declarations, reservations, and understandings, he recommended its ratification.
The purpose of Protocol II was to supplement, without altering the field of applicability, Common Article 3 for the protection of victims of conflicts not of an international character. See Protocol II, supra note 6, at art. 1. The ICRC United States position regarding the scope provision of Protocol II reflects support for a broad application of these protections, and by implication, an expanded definition of what qualifies as such a conflict :
The final text of Protocol II did not meet all the desires of the United States and other western delegations. In particular, the Protocol only applies to internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups are under responsible command and exercise control over such a part of the national territory as to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. This is a narrower scope than we would have desired, and has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerilla operations over a wide area. We are therefore recommending that the US ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the United States will apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the 1949 Conventions (and only such conflicts) which will include all non-international armed conflicts as traditionally defined (but not internal disturbances, riots and sporadic acts of violence).
While this language refers to “traditionally defined” non-international armed conflicts, it also clearly represents U.S. opposition to narrowly defining the scope of Common Article 3 and Protocol II, with a clear intent to exclude only “non-conflict” internal matters from this scope of coverage. This position seems logical considering the quasi trans-national nature of many “internal” armed conflicts that occurred during this period (e.g., Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador).
Defining what constitutes a “traditional” non-international armed conflict today differs substantially from how that term would have been defined in 1986. The emergence of trans-national, highly organized and well equipped groups espousing a goal of waging “war” against democratic nations is primarily a post Cold War phenomenon. While conflict with such groups was obviously not the object of United States concern at the time this position was asserted, the pragmatic nature of the US policy reflected in this position supports expanding the definition of “traditional” to encompass such hostile groups.
In summary, military operations conducted by the United States against non-state trans-national terrorist elements are simply “armed conflicts.” Accordingly, such operations trigger the basic principles of military necessity (and the customary standards of means and methods applicable to noninternational armed conflicts) and humanity (the principles reflected in Common Article 3 and GP II) as a matter of customary international law. (34 JULY 2005 THE ARMY LAWYER)
One aspect of military operations in Iraq seems undeniable – the US and multi-national forces are engaged in an “armed conflict” of some character. Whether international, internal, or hybrid such as trans-national, the undeniable “armed conflict” aspect of these operations require analysis of not only the applicability of the law of war as a matter of law, but also as a matter of policy through the conduit of the DOD Law of War Program.
Impact of DOD Policy on Legal Analysis
Any analysis of applicable rules related to the conduct of military operations by US forces in Iraq requires analysis of DOD policy – specifically the DOD policy related to compliance with the law of war established in DOD Directive 5100.77.29
The simple policy mandate of that directive – that the armed forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during all conflicts, no matter how those conflicts are characterized – is directly applicable to military operations in Iraq. Indeed, it was the almost inevitable uncertainty related to determining the legal character of such armed conflicts that motivated a policy mandate requiring full compliance with the law of war during any armed conflict as the default standard for the armed forces of the United States.
As is often the case with “simple” mandates, the devil is in the details. Whether this truism is applicable to this policy mandate has been the subject of substantial debate within the community of operational law specialists. In this situation, however, this basic mandate would purport to obviate the need to determine whether the conflict in Iraq qualified as “international,” “internal,” or some hybrid category such as “trans national.” Instead, the policy would require US forces to treat all operations as if they were being conducted during the course of an international armed conflict, and accordingly, comply with all rules derived from the law of war considered by the United States applicable to such conflicts.
Because unlike legal mandates, policy is more easily subject to authorized deviation, a legitimate question related to this policy is whether deviation is ever justified, and if so, what level of authority is empowered to authorize such deviation. While the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) implementing instruction expressly allows for “competent authority” to authorize deviation from the required application of law of war “principles” during non-conflict operations, there is no analogous deviation provision during armed conflicts. Thus, it would appear that no commander is empowered to authorize deviation from compliance with the entire body of the law of war, even during a conflict not triggering such broad application as a matter of law. While it seems logical to conclude that the CJCS, as the proponent of the policy mandate, or any higher competent command, retain the authority to direct or authorize deviation from this broad mandate, it seems improper to derive an “implied” authority for subordinate commands to do so.
Analyzing Applicability of Law of War Treaties
Whether applicable as a matter of law, or as a matter of policy, a determination of which provisions of the law of war are considered binding by the United States is still required. In relation to the specific issue raised by the use of the minaret, this determination requires an understanding of the distinction between treaties ratified by the United States, and treaties signed by the United States, but pending ratification. This distinction is the result of the disparate status of the two primary treaties Pragmatically, these armed conflicts are best characterized as trans-national armed conflicts, a characterization that reflects the global nature of such operations.
It is not uncommon for practitioners to assert that this policy mandate requires compliance with only the “principles and spirit” of the law of war. The plain language of the directive, however, renders this position patently erroneous. While following the principles and spirit of the law of war is without doubt required during all military operations, any operation that is considered by the United States to fall within the rubric of “armed conflict” triggers application of the law of war as if such application was required as a matter of law. The forthcoming revision to this directive will not in any way alter this conclusion, and will in fact elevate the requirement to comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts from a service component responsibility to an explicit statement of DOD policy.
Having been ratified by the United States, after receiving the requisite advice and consent of the Senate, Hague IV falls within the scope of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,36 and therefore must be regarded as the “supreme law of the land.” While US jurisprudence related to the law of treaties does allow for a later in time statutory contradiction to this treaty, no such statute exists, and indeed, every statutory and policy reference to the subject matter of the law of war has confirmed the binding nature of this treaty. (The customary international law status of the provisions of this treaty provide an additional basis for concluding the United States is bound to them). In contrast to the Hague IV, the Cultural Property Convention falls into an authoritative “twilight zone” under traditional doctrines of the relationship between US and international law. The Cultural Property Convention was signed by the United States on 14 May 1954. It was not, however, transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent until January 1999, and as of this date, advice and consent has not been granted. Thus, this treaty is signed by the United States, but is not ratified.
Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, the treaty does not fall under the auspices of the Supremacy Clause, and as a matter of international law, the United States is not a party to the treaty. A signed treaty that is pending advice and consent and subsequent ratification for a long time period is not uncommon in United States treaty practice, nor among other states in the community of nations. As a result, customary international law has developed a doctrine to address the question of the force and effect of treaties pending ratification. This doctrine is reflected in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, ironically, is a treaty that itself has been signed by the United States, but not yet ratified. Known as the “object and purpose” rule, this principle of customary international law imposes an obligation on states that have expressed intent to be bound to a treaty through signature to refrain from any activity that might defeat the “object and purpose” of that treaty for the period of time ratification is pending.
This “Article 18” obligation is terminated only when a signatory state has taken appropriate steps to demonstrate a clear intention not to become a party to the treaty. This is normally understood as requiring some action at the international level, such as submitting a formal diplomatic note to the treaty depository. The United States has taken no action to manifest its intent not to become a party to the Cultural Property Convention. On the contrary, as recently as 1999, the President reinforced the executive branch’s desire that the United States become a party to this treaty. As a result, customary international law would appear to require the United States to refrain from activities that defeat the “object and purpose” of that treaty.
Rules Applicable to This Incident
Pursuant to DOD policy, the armed forces of the United States must comply with the law of war in Iraq regardless of the actual characterization of the conflict as “international” or “non-international.” In order to execute this obligation, however, the prima facie issue of what the United States considers to be the applicable rules of the law of war triggered by the policy mandate of the DOD Law of War Program must be resolved. There is no dispute that the provisions of Hague IV, which operate to protect cultural and religious property through Article 27, fall within this category of applicable rules.
The Hague IV requires the following :
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand. While this provision reflects a general goal of protecting religious and cultural objects, it does not expressly prohibit the use of such objects for military purposes. Furthermore, the “as far as possible” caveat suggests a “military necessity” exception to this general prohibition.
There is simply nothing in Hague IV that, through the conduit of the DOD Law of War Program, categorically prohibits the method in which this minaret was used. Hague IV does include an apparently absolute prohibition on the use of religious property during belligerent occupation. The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.
All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings. This principle of international law is also presumptively applicable to the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Both treaties were signed by the United States, and neither has been ratified. United States signature created a prima facie presumption that the object and purpose rule is applicable to those treaties. It is true that with regard to Protocol I, the Executive Branch informed the Senate that it did not intend to submit the treaty for advice and consent because it was considered “fatally flawed.”
While this might appear to satisfy the requirement to demonstrate US intent not to become a party to the treaty, the purely domestic nature of this action renders such a conclusion questionable. Release from this obligation would appear to require some international declaration of similar content, although it is plausible that the cumulative effect of the Letter of Transmittal, the passage of time since signature, and other evidence that the US does not consider itself bound to this treaty (military manuals and an absence to any reference to provisions of Protocol I in ICRC U.S. policies related to military operations), sufficiently demonstrate US intent not to become a party to this treaty. It is also possible that the Senate might question the constitutionality of carrying out treaty obligations pursuant to this rule of international law prior to the treaty receiving the requisite constitutional advice and consent from the Senate. In such a situation, domestic validity of compliance is enhanced proportionally to the degree to which the subject matter is associated with the President’s Article II authority. Such association seems extremely close with regard to a treaty regulating the conduct of military operations. In contrast, Protocol II has been submitted by the Executive Branch for advice and consent, with subsequent requests by the Executive Branch for the Senate to complete this action. Thus, unlike Protocol I, there appears to be little doubt that the United States remains obligated under the object and purpose rule vis à vis Protocol II.
First, it is located in the occupation section of Hague IV. This rule must be interpreted within the context of rules developed at the beginning of the last century for control and temporary administration of enemy territory during belligerent occupation. Within this context, it is reasonable to presume that this rule was based on an expectation that the occupation would be generally unopposed, a situation clearly distinguishable from that in Iraq. Second, and far more significant, this rule must be considered within the context of subsequent treaty provisions developed for the specific purpose of protecting cultural property during armed conflict. As will be explained below, these rules did not adopt a distinct framework for such protection during belligerent occupation. In fact, the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Civilians in Time of War of 1949, the most comprehensive source of authority for the conduct of belligerent occupation, does not include any provision mandating special protection for religious property, but instead applies to such religious property the general prohibition against the destruction of property in occupied territory, absent imperative military necessity. These later in time treaty provisions, some of which specifically address the issue of the treatment of religious property of cultural heritage, should be interpreted as controlling even if they purport to contradict the unqualified prohibition of the Hague IV.
Reference to the provisions of these other law of war treaties does appear to provide a more precise rule of decision, although the “implied” military necessity exception noted above continues to have analytical impact. Article 4 of the Cultural Property Convention imposes the following obligation on the parties to a conflict :
[r]espect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property. This obligation, however, is qualified by the subsequent section, which provides that “[T]he obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present Article may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.”
Thus, use of cultural property as an observation position appears consistent with the principles reflected in the Cultural Property Convention if such use is the only feasible means available for the commander to achieve a valid military objective. Certainly, the protection of friendly forces or the local population from threats posed by dissident or hostile elements during a period of occupation qualify as such a purpose. In the opinion of this author, the key consideration in analyzing the permissibility of such use would be the legitimacy of the conclusion that no other feasible alternate was available to achieve the important military objective.
With regard to this imperative military necessity qualifier, it is critical to distinguish the protection afforded cultural property as defined in Article 1 of the Cultural Property Convention from property granted the status of “special protection” in accordance with Article 8 of that Convention. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Convention, military use of property granted “special protection,” or military use of surrounding areas, is prohibited with no military necessity exception.
Cultural property is defined in the Convention as follows : Article 1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “cultural property” shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership :
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in subparagraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as “centres containing monuments”.
The constraint against military use of religious property of cultural heritage is more categorical in Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions. Article 53 of Protocol I (applicable to international armed conflict) prohibits use in support of the military effort of all “places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of the people.” Article 16 of Protocol II (applicable to non-international armed conflict) reflects an analogous prohibition. Both of these articles, however, begin with the following introductory language : “[W]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant international instruments”.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary to this article : The protection laid down in this article is accorded “without prejudice” to the provisions of other relevant international instruments. From the beginning of the discussions regarding Article 53 it was agreed that there was no need to revise the existing rules on the subject, but that the protection and respect for cultural objects should be confirmed. It was therefore necessary to state at the beginning of the article that it did not modify the relevant existing instruments. For example, this means that in case of a contradiction between this article and a rule of the 1954 Convention the latter is applicable, though of course only insofar as the Parties concerned are bound by that Convention. If one of the Parties is not bound by the Convention, Article 53 applies. Moreover, Article 53 applies even if all the Parties concerned are bound by another international instrument insofar as it supplements the rules of that instrument.
Thus, while neither Protocol I nor II expressly provide for an imperative military necessity exception to the prohibition against the use of cultural property in support of the military effort, if the application of such an exception is appropriate in 63.
According to Article 8 :
Granting of Special Protection
Art. 8. 1. There may be placed under special protection a limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural property in the event of armed conflict, of centres containing monuments and other immovable cultural property of very great importance, provided thatthey :
(a) are situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial centre or from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for example, an aerodrome, broadcasting station, establishment engaged upon work of national defence, a port or railway station of relative importance or a main line of communication;
(b) are not used for military purposes.
2. A refuge for movable cultural property may also be placed under special protection, whatever its location, if it is so constructed that, in all probability, it will not be damaged by bombs.
3. A centre containing monuments shall be deemed to be used for military purposes whenever it is used for the movement of military personnel or material, even in transit. The same shall apply whenever activities directly connected with military operations, the stationing of military personnel, or the production of war material are carried on within the centre.
4. The guarding of cultural property mentioned in paragraph I above by armed custodians specially empowered to do so, or the presence, in the vicinity of such cultural property, of police forces normally responsible for the maintenance of public order, shall not be deemed to be used for military purposes.
5. If any cultural property mentioned in paragraph I of the present Article is situated near an important military objective as defined in the said paragraph, it may nevertheless be placed under special protection if the High Contracting Party asking for that protection undertakes, in the event of armed conflict, to make no use of the objective and particularly, in the case of a port, railway station or aerodrome, to divert all traffic therefrom. In that event, such diversion shall be prepared in time of peace.
6. Special protection is granted to cultural property by its entry in the “International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection”. This entry shall only be made, in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention and under the conditions provided for in the Regulations for the execution of the Convention.
The principles reflected in the provisions of the Cultural Property Convention seem most relevant for analysis of the use of this property based on both the subject of the treaty and the fact that the United States has signed this treaty and appears to remain committed to ratification. This treaty, by its terms, applies to both international and non-international armed conflict, and is implicated by the “object and purpose” rule reflected in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention. There is no clear definition of the scope and extent of this “Article 18” obligation, although it is generally accepted that it certainly does not require full treaty compliance. Instead, a good faith assessment of the activity in question must be engaged in to determine if such activity appears to be a flagrant derogation from the essence of the treaty, thereby defeating the basic purpose of that treaty. As noted above, reconciling the use of the minaret in this situation with the principles reflected in the Cultural Property Convention requires a precise understanding of the distinction between generally protected cultural property and specially protected cultural property. The use of the minaret in this situation was presumptively based on a determination of imperative military necessity. If this presumption is valid, there is no reason to conclude that the use violated the object and purpose of the treaty, and in fact the use would have been consistent with the obligations imposed by the treaty had it been binding at the time.
However, if the presumption is invalid – if some feasible alternate to the use of the minaret had been available to the commander – it is difficult to reconcile the unnecessary transformation of the minaret into a valid and highly significant military objective for an opponent as being consistent with the fundamental purpose of the Cultural Property Convention.
As with many provisions of law of war treaties that have not been ratified by the United States, legal advisors are often called upon to asses whether the provision was at the time of drafting, or subsequently evolved into, customary international law. In such a situation, the United States is bound to comply not with the particular article of the treaty, but with the principle reflected in that article.
Whether the collective effect of these treaty provisions justifies a conclusion that the general obligation to refrain from military use of cultural property – subject to an imperative military necessity exception – amounts to a customary international law norm is subject to debate. A comprehensive discussion of the relationship between treaty law and customary international law is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice to say that it is a well accepted principle of international law that the provision of a treaty can create a new obligation that subsequently “ripens” into a customary obligation; or codify a pre-existing customary obligation.
For example, according to various sources, the most oft cited of which is the “Matheson” statement, at the time Protocol I was drafted the United States regarded many of the articles as either a reflection of existing customary international law Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, States Party to the Main Treaties (June 15, 2005), at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/party_main_
treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf”> [hereinafter Listing of States party] (listing States party to Protocol I and Protocol II).
The law of war is derived from two principle sources :
a. Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions), such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
b. Custom : Although some of the law of war has note been incorporated in any treaty or convention which the United States is a party, this body of unwritten or customary law is firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law. (See FM 27-10, supra note 6, para. 4.)
Subsequent practice also suggests that some articles of Protocol I may have ripened into customary international law. There is no explicit United States position on whether the rules related to the military use of cultural property reflected in the treaties analyzed above fall into the category of customary international law, either as a reflection of a customary obligation that existed at the time they were drafted, or as a positive development in the law of war that has subsequently ripened into a customary obligation. There is ample implied support, however, for such a conclusion. First, as noted above, the Cultural Property Convention was signed by the United States, and remains the subject of executive branch ratification efforts. Second, there is no indication that the United States included Article 53 of Protocol I among those articles of Protocol I considered so fatally flawed that they required rejection of the entire Protocol.
Third, and perhaps of most significant, the basic concept of an extremely proscribed military use of cultural property is reflected not only in the Cultural Property Convention, but also in Protocol II78 – a treaty signed by the United States and also subject to executive branch ratification efforts.
Furthermore, both these treaties expressly extend this principle into the realm of non-international armed conflict, supporting the conclusion that it is considered a fundamental norm of the law of war. Thus, either through operation of the “object and purpose” rule as it relates to the Cultural Property Convention, or through the conclusion that Article 53 of Protocol I related to the use of cultural property for military purposes reflects a principle of customary international law, the extremely limited justification for the military use of cultural property appears to fall under the auspices of the “comply with the law of war” mandate of DOD Directive 5100.
Accordingly, regardless of the characterization of the conflict in Iraq, such use would be improper absent imperative military necessity. Furthermore, there is a strong argument to support the conclusion that regardless of the characterization of the conflict in Iraq, this prohibition is applicable as a matter of international law. The combination of the Cultural Property Convention and the effort to reinforce the protection of cultural property reflected in Protocol’s I and II provide substantial indication that this prohibition is applicable in both international and internal conflict as a customary international law principle applicable to all conflicts.
Conclusion
Assuming, arguendo, that the minaret used by US forces in the referenced article fell within the definition of cultural property, the use was permissible based only on a determination of imperative military necessity. While use of the vantage point offered by such a structure was undoubtedly intended to enhance the effectiveness of the operation, the prohibition against the military use of cultural property absent such a justification does not allow for a general military necessity based exception. Instead, the concept of imperative necessity suggests that no other feasible alternative be available for achieving what is presumptively an important military objective. This prohibition has arguably attained customary international law status, and at a minimum, appears to be binding on US forces through either operation of the object and purpose rule derived from the international law of treaties, or through operation of DOD Directive 5100.
As noted above, however, this article was not intended to simply address the question of whether use of this minaret was or was not consistent with the law of war. Instead, this reported incident was relied upon to illustrate the variety of considerations associated with such an issue. In so doing, it is hoped that this article will contribute to the ability of judge advocates to address similar issues during future operations.
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